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OFFICIAL DOLLARIZATION:C URRENT
EXPERIENCES AND ISSUES
Z ˇeljko Bogetic ´
Dollarization is a portfolio shift away from domestic currency to
foreign currency, to fulfill the main functions of money—store of
value, unit of account, and medium of exchange. It is typically a result
of unstable macroeconomic conditions and is a rational response of
people seeking to diversify their assets in the face of heightened
domestic currency risk. The process of dollarization may be more or
less spontaneous, partial and unofficial, reflecting a piecemeal shift in
preferences by individuals for foreign currency, or it may be full and
official, in that a country adopts a foreign currency as exclusive or
parallel legal tender.
There is an extensive body of writing on unofficial dollarization
(see, e.g., Balin ˜o, Bennet, and Borensztein 1999; Age ´nor and Kahn
1996; Calvo and Ve ´gh 1996; Clements and Schwartz 1993; McKinnon
1996; Sahay and Ve ´gh 1996; and Savastano 1992). Surprisingly,
though, there is little detailed country-specific analysis on official
dollarization, save some discussion of Panama, the best-known offi-
cially dollarized country. A notable exception is Moreno-Villalaz
(1998, 1999). And there is a surprising lack of basic published infor-
mation on the countries and territories that officially use foreign
currency in place of domestically issued currency. In part, this is so
because unofficial dollarization is more prevalent than official dollar-
ization, and because officially dollarized countries are very small.
A number of factors have created renewed interest in official dol-
larization. In Europe, the advent of the euro and the interest of
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179Eastern European countries in monetary union with Western Eu-
rope—whether by joining the European Central Bank, by unilaterally
“dollarizing” via the introduction of the German mark/euro as legal
tender (e.g., Montenegro), or by establishing currency boards (e.g.,
Estonia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Bosnia, and Herzegovina)—have
spurred much research (see, e.g., Begg 1997; Dornbusch 1997; IMF
1997; Masson 1996; and Bogetic ´ 2000a, 2000b). In Latin America, the
experience of Argentina’s currency board-like system since 1991 and
Panama’s history of official dollarization since 1904 have stirred de-
bate, especially in Argentina, El Salvador, and Mexico. Most recently,
Ecuador’s dollarization project, which began on January 9, 2000, has
intensified academic and policy debate and moved it closer toward
practical policy issues that arise in the course of implementing official
dollarization. Finally, the worldwide effects of financial crises in
Mexico and Argentina (1994–95), East Asia (1997–98), Russia (1998),
and Brazil (1998–99) have motivated reexamination of the character-
istics of stable exchange rate regimes.
Even so, literature on official dollarization remains scant and new
contributions are emerging only very recently, largely motivated by
the Argentine and Ecuadorian dollarization projects (see, e.g., Bo-
rensztein and Berg 2000; Bogetic ´ and Schuler 1999; Calvo 1999a,
1999b; Hanke and Schuler 1999; Hanke (2000); and Joint Economic
Committee 2000). This paper attempts to remedy the shortage by
answering several key questions:
• What is the present incidence of officially dollarized economies,
and what are some of their salient characteristics?
• What has been the experience of Panama, the largest and most
well-known officially dollarized economy?
• What do we know about the economic costs and benefits of
official dollarization?
• What are the existing and prospective seigniorage sharing ar-
rangements?
• What conditions may be conducive to official dollarization?
• What are the prospects for official dollarization in Argentina and
other Western Hemisphere countries?
Unofficial and Official Dollarization:
How Do They Differ?
Dollarization usually refers to unofficial dollarization, which is far
more widespread than official dollarization. As is common, I use
dollarization to refer to the use of any foreign currency, not only the
U.S. dollar. I distinguish between unofficial and official dollarization
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180to highlight important differences and to underpin later discussion of
the costs and benefits of official dollarization. The crucial difference
between unofficial and official dollarization is whether the foreign
currency is used voluntarily by residents even though it is not legal
tender or whether it is officially recognized as legal tender by the
government.
Unofficial Dollarization
Unofficial dollarization occurs when residents of a country choose
to hold a large share of their financial wealth in assets denominated
in foreign currency, where foreign currency lacks the legal tender
privileges that domestic currency enjoys (Balin ˜o et al. 1999: 1). Un-
official dollarization may take a variety of forms, including holding (1)
foreign currency bonds or other noncash assets; (2) foreign currency
cash, whether possessing it is legal or illegal; (3) foreign currency
deposits in domestic banks; and (4) foreign currency deposits in for-
eign banks. It is useful to distinguish between currency substitution,
which is the use of foreign cash and foreign currency deposits pri-
marily as a means of payment, and asset substitution, which is the use
of foreign currency assets primarily as a store of value. Economists
have generally associated unofficial dollarization with asset substitu-
tion, particularly substitution of foreign currency deposits for domes-
tic currency deposits, which is an easily measured indicator (Balin ˜oe t
al. 1999: 5; and Calvo and Ve ´gh 1996).
The mixture among these forms of unofficial dollarization varies
across countries, depending on economic, legal, and institutional fac-
tors. Where residents have had time to adapt to high inflation, all four
types of unofficial dollarization may occur simultaneously, and hold-
ings of residents of foreign currency in cash or in foreign bank de-
posits may be significant. Where high inflation is relatively new, resi-
dents may have some foreign currency deposits in domestic or foreign
banks but hold little foreign cash. In the process of unofficial dollar-
ization, a “flight to currency quality” in deposits typically precedes a
flight from domestic currency cash to foreign currency cash. Ex-
change controls may unintentionally encourage unofficial dollariza-
tion, by making people afraid that when they want foreign currency
they will be unable to obtain it legally at any price.
Today, unofficial dollarization is significant in many developing
countries, including economies in transition from socialism. A recent
IMF study measured unofficial dollarization by the ratio of foreign
currency deposits to the broad money supply (M2 or M3). In 1995, 18
countries with IMF arrangements had high unofficial dollarization
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181(exceeding 30 percent), with the average degree of dollarization of 45
percent. Another 34 countries had moderate unofficial dollarization,
averaging about 16 percent of the broad money supply. Unofficial
dollarization was not limited to developing countries: foreign cur-
rency deposits were about 22 percent of broad money in Greece and
more than 15 percent in the United Kingdom (Balin ˜o et al. 1999: 2).
While there are no firm estimates of U.S. dollar notes (paper cur-
rency) circulating outside the United States, Porter and Judson (1996:
283) recently estimated the proportion at 50 to 70 percent of the total.
Officially Dollarized and Bimonetary Systems
Official or full dollarization is a complete monetary union with a
foreign country from which a country imports a currency, by making
the foreign currency full legal tender and reducing its own currency,
if any, to a subsidiary role. In officially dollarized countries, there is no
domestic currency, no currency risk and, therefore, no risk of cur-
rency crises. As a result, domestic interest rate structure tends to be
similar to the one prevailing in the wider monetary area. In a few
countries, which we also include in this category as borderline cases—
perhaps better called bimonetary systems—a foreign currency is used
widely in the role of legal tender but it has a subsidiary role to the
domestic currency.
Only a relatively small number of countries have officially adopted
a foreign currency as legal tender. The reasons include the political
symbolism of a national currency, historical patterns of use of domes-
tic and foreign currency, and economic factors such as the perceived
costs of dollarization, primarily in terms of the loss of independent
monetary and exchange policies, seigniorage revenues, and domestic
lender of last resort. Roughly 10.5 million people live in officially
dollarized economies today. As of the start of 2000, 28 countries and
territories have officially dollarized economies (Table 1). All are small.
Many are islands, often with only a few thousand inhabitants. Six are
members of the IMF: Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Pa-
lau, Panama, and San Marino. Of the six, the best known is Panama,
which has 2.7 million people and a 1998 GDP of US$9.1 billion.
Official dollarization has more than one form. Officially dollarized
economies vary with respect to the number of foreign currencies they
allow to circulate as full legal tender and with respect to the relation-
ship between domestic currency, if it exists, and foreign currency.
Most dollarized countries give only one foreign currency full legal
tender status, but Andorra gives it to both the French franc and the





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































184Despite these modest numbers, official dollarization is attracting
increasing attention. In part this is due to the emergence of the euro,
Ecuador’s dollarization project, the possible official dollarization of
Argentina, and the recent surge in interest and practice of a close
institutional cousin of official dollarization—the currency boards—
five of which were introduced during the past decade: Argentina
(1991), Estonia (1992), Lithuania (1994), Bulgaria (1997), and Bosnia
and Herzegovina (1998). Recently, on November 2, 1999, Montene-
gro dollarized its economy by making the German mark legal tender
in parallel to the Yugoslav dinar, before it officially withdrew the
Yugoslav dinar from circulation on November 13, 2000, making the
German mark the sole legal tender. And the U.N. has introduced the
German mark and the U.S. dollar for use in Kosovo and East Timor.
These developments are likely to alter the monetary map of the world
dramatically in the 21st century. They may reflect a more fundamen-
tal aspect of globalization, implying a gradual movement toward a
smaller number of key currencies, such as the dollar, euro, and yen
(Mundell 1999).
In countries with official dollarization, there is no domestic cur-
rency at all or the domestic currency has a distinctly subsidiary role.
Panama, for example, issues its own coins, but uses U.S. dollar notes.
A variation of this is what one might call an officially bimonetary
system (Table 2) in which a foreign currency is legal tender and may
dominate bank deposits, but may not dominate payment of wages,
taxes, and everyday transactions such as grocery shopping. Examples
are Namibia and Lesotho, which are members of the Common Mon-
etary Area with South Africa. They are also the only independent
countries that collect seigniorage from either dollarization or a bi-
monetary system. The CMA has an agreement for sharing seigniorage
and for maintaining common exchange controls with outside coun-
tries. The Namibian dollar and the Lesotho loti both circulate at
one-to-one with the South African rand.
By virtue of their small size, officially dollarized economies are
highly open. Most have convertibility for current account transac-
tions. Five of the six that are members of the IMF have long accepted
Article VIII of the IMF Articles of Agreement, which obliges them
not to impose controls on current account transactions (Table 3).
Officially dollarized economies also have few or no restrictions on
capital account transactions, and transactions for external payments
are relatively free.
Likewise, bimonetary systems typically have highly open econo-
mies with liberal current and capital account regulations (Table 4). As











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































188small though the average size is larger than in officially dollarized
systems. They tend to be located in the neighborhood of a dominant
economy or groups of economies with which they conduct much of
their trade and capital transactions. Hence, the use of the foreign
currency in their domestic economies is often necessitated by virtue
of their openness and heavy reliance on trade (and factor mobility)
with their larger neighbors.
Much like countries operating currency board systems, officially
dollarized economies do not have independent monetary policies.
Under both systems, the economy adjusts to external shocks through
factor and product markets with the help of the financial system,
rather than by adjusting exchange rates. Changes in world interest
rates and capital inflows or outflows are quickly reflected in the bank-
ing system and the availability and terms of credit to the economy.
Officially dollarized countries that allow full participation by foreign
financial institutions become tightly integrated into large and liquid
world financial markets. Financial integration plus official dollariza-
tion give banks a worldwide field in which to make loans in dollars.
Consequently, the location of loans is not closely linked to the loca-
tion of deposits. The ability to switch dollar funds without currency
risk between the domestic economy and the rest of the world tends to
minimize the booms and busts that often arise in countries having
independent monetary policies and financial systems not well inte-
grated into the world system.
Panama’s Experience with Official Dollarization
Panama is the largest officially dollarized economy with an almost
100-year experience with such a system. Therefore, it is a natural
laboratory for understanding how official dollarization might work in
other settings. Clearly, any inferences must make appropriate caveats
and be based on a thorough understanding of the specifics (and
idiosyncrasies) of Panama’s experience. The following is a brief over-
view of some salient characteristics of Panama’s experience. (Moreno-
Villalaz 1999, Schuler 2000, Bogetic ´ 2000a, and IMF country reports
[www.imf.org] provide more details.)
Monetary System
Since 1904, Panama has used U.S. dollar notes (paper money) as
domestic currency. Panama issues a domestic currency, the balboa (1
balboa = US$1), but it circulates only as coins. Panama’s financial
system has a significant presence of foreign banks. There is no central
bank and no centralized foreign reserves. The Banco Nacional de

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































191Role of Foreign Banks
In 1970, a banking law liberalized Panama’s financial markets and
allowed full entry of foreign banks. The capital account is entirely
open, and banks are free to invest excess funds in Panama or abroad.
Arguably, full financial integration into the world economy and the
consequent ability of banks to adjust their portfolios freely between
domestic and foreign assets has been an important mechanism of
domestic adjustment, preventing the booms and busts in lending,
overvalued exchange rates, and falling foreign reserves that have
plagued other countries in the region. Foreign banks, mainly U.S.
banks, have been de facto lenders of last resort, increasing their
exposure to the domestic economy when it has suffered unfavorable
shocks because they have perceived opportunities for profitable lend-
ing.
Macroeconomic Performance
Panama’s macroeconomic performance has been solid. Inflation
has averaged 3 percent per year in the 1961–97 period. Growth av-
eraged 8.1 percent from 1961 to 1971 and again from 1978 to 1981,
and has averaged 2.5 percent in other years. Real interest rates have
remained in low-to mid-single digits. The real exchange rate has
shown little variation compared with the real exchange rates of other
Latin American countries. There have been no systemic banking cri-
ses.
Lender of Last Resort
Panama has no domestic lender of last resort. Domestic banks have
established lines of credit with foreign banks with branches in
Panama and have been able to draw on them during liquidity
crunches. The Panamanian government and Banco Nacional de
Panama ´ have not rescued failing banks, but few banks have failed
over the past 30 years. A privately funded deposit insurance scheme
is in the process of being established in accordance with a 1998 law.
The Payments System
The payments system is a real-time gross settlement system oper-
ated by the Banco Nacional de Panama ´. Payment is effected through
the bank’s account at a New York bank. Foreign banks sometimes
bypass local clearing and clear through the New York Clearing House
or the Federal Reserve’s Fedwire, as in the case of the branch of a
U.S. bank in Panama lending to the branch of another U.S. bank.
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192There are also banks, such as the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, that
act as correspondents for other banks in clearing.
The Nature of Major Shocks and Economic Adjustment
Panama has experienced several major shocks that caused signifi-
cant economic disruption, but the banking system has held up well.
The shocks were not related to the monetary system. They included
political crises in January 1964, due to riots in the Canal zone, and in
1967–69, the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979, the 1982 Latin American
debt default, and the 1988–89 crisis immediately preceding and dur-
ing the embargo and the U.S. invasion. All caused a withdrawal of
domestic deposits and major economic dislocation. However, during
the 1964 and 1967–69 crises, several private banks responded by
selling their assets abroad and increasing domestic credit, despite the
outflow of domestic deposits. This cushioned the adverse impact on
the domestic economy (Moreno-Villalaz 1999). In sum, full dollariza-
tion in Panama is not a panacea and has not insulated the country
from shocks. But those shocks were essentially external to the mon-
etary system. And at least during some major crises, the banks re-
sponded in a stabilizing fashion.
Sovereign Spreads, Interest Rates, and Availability
of Long-Term Credit
Panama’s sovereign spreads have been consistently lower than in
other Latin American countries. For example, between September 1,
1994, and April 12, 1999 the average stripped spread on Argentine
sovereign bonds (according to the J.P. Morgan Emerging Market
Bond Index Plus) was 736 basis points; it exceeded 1,000 basis points
around the time of Tequila crisis (February 1995) and Brazil’s crisis
(September 1988). By contrast, during the subperiod for which data
are available for Panama (July 1996 to April 12, 1999), the average
stripped spread on its bonds was 405 basis points with a brief spike to
about 700 basis points in late August 1998. While not all the differ-
ence in the spreads may be attributable solely to the differences in the
currency systems between Panama and other countries, these data
provide a rough indication of the maximum order of magnitude of
reduction in the yield spreads (and, implicitly, country risk) that could
be possible if Argentina officially dollarizes its economy. Similarly, the
level of spreads and their peaks in Peru, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezu-
ela were consistently higher than in Panama; the exception is Costa
Rica (as indicated by Borensztein and Berg 2000).
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Nominal interest rates in Panama have persistently been the lowest
or nearly the lowest in Latin America (Bogetic ´ 2000a, Schuler 2000,
and Borensztein and Berg 2000). Real interest rates have also been
relatively low and steady, avoiding the swings from negative to posi-
tive double digits that have occurred elsewhere in Latin America.
Finally, an important quality of Panama’s financial system is the avail-
ability of long-term domestic credit. Panama is the only Latin Ameri-
can country where 30-year fixed-rate mortgages are available in “do-
mestic” currency (Moreno-Villalaz 1999, Hausmann et al. 1999). By
contrast, in developing countries with relatively stable currencies,
loans for 20 or 30 years are often unavailable, and interest rates on
shorter term loans are adjusted periodically rather than offered at
fixed rates.
Seigniorage Sharing
The United States collects all seigniorage on the use of the U.S.
dollar in Panama, and there is no seigniorage sharing. Panama collects
a small amount of seigniorage on domestic balboa coins that consti-
tute about 9 percent of total cash and coin in circulation.
Seigniorage Sharing in Officially Dollarized
and Bimonetary Systems
Seigniorage sharing used to be common among British colonies
operating multicolonial currency boards.
1 That practice, however, has
largely disappeared with the replacement of most currency boards
with central banks in the 1950s and 1960s.
2 Today, among fully dol-
larized and bimonetary systems, only one seigniorage sharing arrange-
ment survives, that between Lesotho, Namibia, and South Africa
within their CMA agreement. However, seigniorage is the most vis-
ible and quantifiable element in the cost-benefit calculus of full dol-
larization (Fischer 1982). Therefore, seigniorage sharing is likely to
figure prominently in any discussion of prospective full dollarization
projects, as has already been the case with Argentina. Hence, it is
useful to compare the CMA arrangement with the current proposals
for Argentina and the United States. Also, it is important to consider
1Multicolonial currency boards (as in West Africa, East Africa, the Caribbean, and Malaya)
had seigniorage sharing arrangements. Other colonies had individual currency boards that
did not share seigniorage with anybody, including the British government (Schuler 1992).
2There is rich literature on currency boards, which is currently undergoing revival with the
advent of five new currency boards during the1990s (Argentina, Bulgaria, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Estonia, and Lithuania). See, for example, Hanke (1999, 2000); Hanke and
Schuler (1999); Schuler (1998); Balin ˜o et al. (1997); and Ghosh, Gulde, and Wolf (1998).
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H.R. 3493), a bill on seigniorage sharing introduced in November
1999 by Senator Connie Mack, chairman of the Joint Economic Com-
mittee, and Representative Paul Ryan.
Seigniorage Sharing in the CMA
In the CMA, the seigniorage sharing arrangement is determined in
Article 6 of the Multilateral Monetary Agreement (Collings 1983).
The agreement provides Lesotho and Namibia a share of seigniorage
determined as two-thirds of the return on the estimated rand circu-
lation in their territories that these countries would have earned had
these funds been invested in South African government securities.
The two-thirds share was agreed to as a compromise to take account
of the differences between short-term and long-term returns on se-
curities. The rand currency in circulation—the basis for the calcula-
tion of the two countries’ shares of seigniorage—is estimated using
amounts of rand currency at a base date (December 31, 1973), sub-
sequently adjusted to reflect changes in the amount in total rand
currency in circulation outside banks in the entire monetary area. The
adjustment factors are set as 6:5 for an increase and 4:5 for a decrease,
reflecting an assumption of a more rapid monetization in the less
developed countries in the monetary union: Lesotho and Namibia.
While this arrangement remains the basis for seigniorage sharing
today, there were recent modifications that altered somewhat the
countries’ actual share of seigniorage from the one outlined above.
Seigniorage Sharing in the European Monetary Union
Monetary income of the national central banks and net profits of
the European Central Bank are distributed according to national
central banks’ share of the paid-up capital of the ECB, which were
determined as an equal-weighted function of population and GDP.
Possible Seigniorage Sharing Arrangements between the
United States and Argentina
The United States Joint Economic Committee (2000) recently pro-
posed a simple formula for sharing revenues from seigniorage as
follows:
Dollarized country’s share of net seigniorage =
{[total average dollar monetary base over the period
× average interest rate on 90-day Treasury bills during the
period]
− net costs of operating the Federal Reserve}
× dollarized country’s share of total dollar monetary base
× proportion of seigniorage
revenue that the United States pays,
OFFICIAL DOLLARIZATION
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from issuing currency (gross seigniorage) and the costs of printing
notes and minting coins and the costs of the staff of the Federal
Reserve System.
In contrast to the CMA formula, the proposed U.S.-Argentine for-
mula assumes that the proportion of seigniorage paid by the United
States on Argentina’s share of dollar monetary base is less than or
equal to 100 percent (i.e., the factor equal to or less than 1.0 in the
last term of the above formula). It does not allow for a greater share
of seigniorage to Argentina arising from a possible faster monetization
than in the rest of the dollar monetary area.
Using this formula, the JEC report estimates that Argentina’s share
of total average dollar monetary base would be about equal to the
value of its currency in 1998: US$16 billion or about 2.8 percent of
the total (projected at US$566 billion at the end of 1999). Further-
more, assuming (1) a 5 percent interest rate on the 90-day Treasury
bill as a proxy for the opportunity cost of reserves, (2) net operating
costs of the Federal reserves of about US$1 billion, and (3) an esti-
mated total average dollar monetary base of US$580 in the year 2000,
the report estimates Argentina’s dollar share of net seigniorage as
follows:
Argentina’s share:
=( [US$580 billion × 0.05] − US$1 billion) × 0.028 × 1
= (US$29 billion − US$ 1 billion) × 0.028 × 1
= US$784 million.
The Barro Proposal
Robert Barro (1999) has proposed a radical simplification in the
seigniorage sharing debate by advocating that the United States sim-
ply transfer to Argentina the U.S. dollar equivalent of its peso cur-
rency in circulation, estimated at about US$16 billion. Instead of
receiving annual transfers based on a more complex formula, such as
the one proposed by the JEC, Argentina would receive this transfer
directly and only once. Notwithstanding the simplicity of the pro-
posal, concerns were raised that such transfers could be subject to a
principal-agent problem whereby the agent (i.e., the dollarized coun-
try) may not use entirely (or at all) the transfer for the specified
purpose (Schuler 2000). While this might not be a problem in the
case of Argentina, the problem would presumably be larger if many
countries were to fully dollarize under this scheme, due to greater
monitoring costs.
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As these examples show, despite the scarcity of revenue sharing
arrangements in the world today, the country of the reserve currency
could, in principle, return to a dollarizing country much of its lost
seigniorage revenues, thereby reducing significantly the most visible,
upfront cost and tilting the dollarizing country’s cost-benefit calculus
in favor of dollarization. The draft International Monetary Stability
Act provides precisely that option (Schuler 2000, Joint Economic
Committee 2000). It gives discretionary power to the Secretary of the
Treasury to certify officially dollarized countries as eligible to recoup
85 of the seigniorage from the United States, as calculated by the
formula provided in the act. The remaining 15 percent would be used
to finance seigniorage rebates to countries that are already dollarized
(e.g., Panama), help pay the cost of operating the Federal Reserve,
and still leave a net revenue to the United States. The formula for
calculating the seigniorage provides for more seigniorage rebate to a
dollarizing country if U.S. interest rates and the dollar coins and
banknotes in worldwide circulation increase.
In a nutshell, the act goes a long way toward making official dol-
larization less costly to a country considering it. However, as in the
recent testimony of Fed chairman Alan Greenspan, the act explicitly
rules out the possibility that the U.S. provide lender of last resort or
supervision services to the country that decides to officially dollarize.
Costs and Benefits of Official Dollarization
Costs
Conventional analysis of the cost of adoption of foreign currency
(Fischer 1982) has focused on the gross costs of official dollarization.
In particular, Fischer emphasizes the loss of seigniorage from moving
from national currency to dollarization. The loss could be thought of
either as a one-time stock cost in terms of the amount of new cur-
rency that has to be acquired, or a continuing flow cost in terms of
seigniorage revenues forgone. These are the costs that are also easiest
to measure. But widespread unofficial dollarization suggests that dol-
larization can have offsetting benefits that are more difficult to mea-
sure.
The gross stock cost is the cost of initially obtaining the dollar notes
and coins necessary to replace national currency in circulation. If
domestic currency notes and coins in circulation are 8 percent of
GNP as was the world average for 1976 (Fischer 1982), that would be
the stock cost of official dollarization. These numbers appear prohibi-
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national money seemed firmly established.
However, in the years since, financial innovation, technological
progress, and the information revolution have progressively reduced
the relative size and importance of the monetary base, constraining
governments in their pursuit of inflation-induced revenue (Friedman
1992: 254–8). The share of currency in GDP also systematically fell in
many countries.
3 For example, in seven selected Latin American
countries (Table 5), in the 1991–97 period this share has been 4.6
percent, considerably lower than in the 1970s.
Another way of measuring these costs is to calculate the flow cost
of dollarization as the continuing loss of seigniorage year after year.
By creating base money, domestic monetary authorities buy real re-
sources in exchange for practically nothing, abstracting from the cost
of printing money and any remuneration of bank reserves by the
monetary authorities. Full dollarization diverts this flow of revenue
from the domestic monetary authority to a foreign monetary author-
ity. Therefore, the flow cost may be measured as the change in re-
serve money in a given year, expressed as percent of GDP. As shown
3Richard Rahn (1999) has recently analyzed the worldwide trend toward greater use of
electronic forms of money (“digital dollars”) and predicted the end of money in the form
of notes and coins (see also Dorn 1997).
TABLE 5
ESTIMATED STOCK AND FLOW COSTS OF OFFICIAL





Flow Cost: Change in
Reserve Money as a
Percentage of GDP
Argentina 1991–96 3.7 0.5
Brazil 1994–96 2.1 1.3
Bolivia 1991–97 4.6 1.4
Ecuador 1992–97 12.2 7.4
El Salvador 1991–96 4.1 2.3
Mexico 1991–97 3.3 0.8
Peru 1991–97 2.1 2.5
Average 4.6 2.3
SOURCE: Author’s calculations based on IMF International Financial Statistics,
lines 14 (reserve money), 14a (currency outside deposit money banks), and 99b
(GDP).
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countries, ranging from 0.5 percent of GDP in Argentina to over 7
percent in Ecuador.
Finally, note that if a dollarized country can recapture seigniorage
through an agreement with the country issuing the currency it uses
(or a country issues some amount of domestic currency, such as
Panama’s coins) the net flow cost of dollarization will be less than the
gross flow cost indicated in Table 5. As indicated, currently only
Namibia and Lesotho, which are bimonetary rather than officially
dollarized, have such a seigniorage sharing agreement.
We have focused on the stock and flow costs of dollarization be-
cause they are the easiest to estimate. Other costs range from the
quantifiable to the vague. Some may not even be costs, but benefits.
We focus on the costs of official dollarization compared to central
banking of the standard typical of developing countries. The costs of
official dollarization compared with a currency board are somewhat
different.
There is the cost of losing a domestic central bank as a lender of last
resort. There are two issues here. The first is whether an officially
dollarized system can provide adequate liquidity to individual banks
in need. In general, official dollarization should not reduce the ability
of the government to provide liquidity under normal conditions. But
an officially dollarized country can achieve the same result if its do-
mestic banks can arrange appropriate credit lines from foreign banks,
as in Argentina (BCRA 1998). Alternatively, the government can sim-
ply accumulate reserves before official dollarization. Neither arrange-
ment provides as extensive a capability as a lender of last resort as a
domestic central bank would. But neither arrangement involves the
danger of a central bank creating inflation and costly bank rescues.
The second issue is whether the system can handle systemwide
bank runs and payments problems. Official dollarization may reduce
the risk of such crises by eliminating the currency risk; by forcing the
domestic banking system to become more competitive, transparent,
and open to external analysis; and by fostering capital account liber-
alization and low inflation (IMF 1998a: 10–11). In a number of coun-
tries with central banks, banking system crises have been extremely
costly (Caprio and Klingebiel 1996a, 1996b; Lindgren et al. 1996).
Their cost has sometimes exceeded 40 percent of GDP, as in Chile
and Argentina in the 1980s (IMF 1998a: 78 and Table 14).
There is also a cost of losing flexibility in monetary and exchange
rate policy. In a dollarized monetary system the national government
cannot devalue the currency or finance budget deficits by creating
inflation, because it does not issue the currency. These features may
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lar to the ones prevailing during the Great Depression. Under such
circumstances, the inability to devalue would clearly be costly. But
under less extreme conditions, the lack of flexibility may be beneficial
rather than costly, as shown by the better than average monetary and
inflation performance of currency board and dollarized systems com-
pared to central banks (Ghosh et al. 1998, Hanke 1999, Schuler
1996). At the same time, in a globalizing world, with large and rapid
capital flows, the scope for truly independent monetary policy is lim-
ited. Moreover, at one end of the spectrum, countries operating cur-
rency boards have already sacrificed flexibility in monetary policy in
exchange for the long-term benefits of low inflation, convertibility,
and a stable currency. For them, going the final step entails no ad-
ditional loss of flexibility. At the other end of the spectrum, countries
whose monetary policy is chronically unstable and lacking in credibil-
ity do not gain much from flexibility, except in the narrow sense that
they can use their discretion to vary revenue from seigniorage by
changing the rate of monetary expansion.
A related claim is that there is a cost of linking business cycles in the
dollarizing country to those in the country whose currency it uses.
Interest rates tend to rise or fall with those of the foreign country,
whereas with a floating exchange rate, or an adjustable peg, they can
fluctuate differently. If the ideal for interest rate policy is to act
counter cyclically, dollarization probably will not achieve it because
the monetary authority of the country whose currency is used pre-
sumably directs policy for its own perceived benefit, not necessarily
that of dollarized countries. If, on the other hand, the objective is
tighter trade and financial links to reap the benefits of full financial
integration, official dollarization is the most direct, irreversible, and
therefore credible way of achieving that. This claim is closely related
to the asymmetric shocks argument (Mundell 1961) in the optimal
currency area literature, and the belief that devaluation would be an
effective instrument of adjustment under certain conditions. By con-
trast, Calvo (1999a, 1999b) suggests that devaluation is not a panacea
either (particularly in the presence of shocks coming from the capital
account) and that it carries significant contractionary risks arising
from extensive unofficial dollarization, which is typical of many de-
veloping countries.
There is also a cost of converting prices, computer programs, cash
registers, and vending machines from domestic currency to the for-
eign currency chosen. This is a one-time expense that will vary con-
siderably from country to country. Finally, there may be associated
legal and financial costs of revising contracts or refinancing. Similar
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low inflation, though.
Benefits
For discussing the benefits of official dollarization, we again use as
the point of reference central banking of the standard typical of
developing countries regardless of whether it uses a fixed or flexible
exchange rate regime. In qualitative terms, the benefits of official
dollarization also apply to a currency board system, though their
quantitative significance will vary from country to country. Currency
board countries considering official dollarization are facing essentially
the same policy tradeoffs as are countries with central banks.
The most obvious benefit of dollarization is that it eliminates trans-
actions costs of exchanging one currency for another and greatly
reduces domestic currency risk (or risk of devaluation of domestic
currency) and, with it, the risk of currency crises. This may in turn
stabilize the capital flows in and out of a country. The benefit is
presumably greatest for countries with a history of currency crises and
highly volatile exchange rates resulting from loose monetary policy.
The more a country’s trade and financial flows are integrated with
countries in the dollar zone, the greater will be the savings from
eliminating exchange risk. Exchange risk with other currency zones,
however, will remain. As indicated above in the section on Panama,
eliminating devaluation risk reduces country risk to the extent that
currency devaluations may feed back into higher interest rates, higher
rates of default, and worse economic performance.
For many developing countries, dollarization can reduce the vola-
tility of the real exchange rate vis-a `-vis countries that have a history of
high inflation and unstable exchange rates. For countries with low
inflation that manage their exchange rates according to a trade-
weighted basket of currencies, it is possible that the multilateral real
exchange rate will become more variable. However, the opportunities
for hedging against currency movements will also increase. Because
the dollar is the most widely used currency in international trade, it
has the largest markets for foreign exchange derivatives. Most hedg-
ing of nondollar currencies against one another is done using the
dollar as an intermediary. Dollarization eliminates one leg of each
hedging transaction against nondollar currencies and the costs in-
volved.
By reducing exchange risk, dollarization can reduce the financial
system’s need for reserves. The existence of a national currency in
effect segregates payments in national currency from payments in
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reserves, under certain realistic assumptions, commercial banks’ need
for reserves only increases as the square root of their liabilities (Ol-
ivera 1971). Dollarization plus financial integration makes the finan-
cial system part of the worldwide pool of dollar liquidity, which is far
larger than the pool of liquidity in, say, Mexican pesos. Moreno-
Villalaz (1999) estimates that in the case of Panama, the financial
system holds perhaps 3 percentage points of GDP less in reserves
than it would if Panama were not dollarized.
For most developing countries, dollarization would reduce infla-
tion, though the reduction in inflation in currency board countries
would likely be very small because of the already low inflation in such
countries. Studies of the relationship between inflation and economic
growth have shown that high and even intermediate inflation is bad
for growth (Dornbusch and Fischer 1993, Fischer 1993b, Bruno and
Easterly 1998). In general, the more credible the disinflation pro-
gram, the less costly it is. Official dollarization, like orthodox currency
boards, provides a sufficiently credible break with past arrangements
that it could minimize the costs of reducing moderate to low inflation.
Note that dollarization does not imply the same rate of inflation
throughout the common currency zone. Typically, countries or re-
gions where economic growth is higher than average see their con-
sumer price indexes rise faster than average, and those where growth
is lower than average see their consumer price indexes rise more
slowly.
The lack of domestic currency also implies a number of related
benefits, which are detailed below. Because official dollarization
would reduce inflation in most developing countries and eliminate
devaluation risk, it would also reduce real interest rates, which contain
premiums for expected inflation or devaluation. Nominal interest
rates in Panama have persistently been the lowest or nearly the lowest
in Latin America (Table 6). Real interest rates have also been rela-
tively low and steady, avoiding the swings from negative to positive
double digits that have occurred elsewhere in Latin America.
Financial markets in the U.S. dollar and euro, the two most likely
currencies for countries considering official dollarization, are far
deeper than those in any other currency. Dollarization can make
long-term financing available where it currently is not. As mentioned
above, Panama is the only Latin American country where 30-year
fixed-rate mortgages are available in “domestic” currency (Hausmann
et al. 1999). Similarly, 15–20 year mortgages are common in the
Eastern Caribbean Central Bank countries that operate a quasi-
currency board system.
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ization may improve government finances by increasing real revenue.
Dollarization reduces the loss of purchasing power of taxes assessed
now but paid later (a reverse Olivera-Tanzi effect). By eliminating the
government’s power to create inflation, official dollarization may fos-
ter fiscal discipline (Fischer 1982). Also, official dollarization may
reduce the external cost of borrowing by reducing currency and coun-
try risks, thereby improving the fiscal position of a country.
Finally, in some cases official dollarization may have favorable dis-
tributional benefits. In the environment of a weak national currency,
the young, financially sophisticated, and wealthy are often better able
to preserve and expand their wealth during periods of high inflation
than are the old (such as pensioners), the poor and, generally, people
living on fixed incomes. Shifting assets from domestic currency to
dollars, or among different kinds of investments in domestic currency,
requires time and effort, and there is often a minimum threshold level
of transaction, which leaves the poor the captive payers of inflation
tax. Some kinds of investments that may have high yields, such as
government securities, require a relatively high minimum investment
and so are unavailable to most people in developing countries. People
can still save by hoarding goods or dollar notes, but they earn no
interest. Official dollarization ends these large redistributions of
wealth that arise during high inflations.
TABLE 6
NOMINAL AND REAL BANK LENDING RATES IN SELECTED






Argentina 1994–97 11.9 9.8
Bolivia 1991–97 50.4 41.7
Brazil 1995–97 35.3
a 6.4
Ecuador 1992–97 43.6 13.0
El Salvador 1992–97 18.1 7.4
Mexico 1993–97 32.5 1.3
Peru 1991–97 165.7 12.4
Venezuela 1992–97 35.4 −26.3
Panama 1991–97 10.7 5.7
aMoney market rate.
SOURCE: International Financial Statistics, line 60b (money market rate), line 60p
(lending rate), and line 64 (consumer prices).
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Official Dollarization?
Optimal Currency Area (OCA) Conditions
A number of country characteristics affect the weighting of the
costs and benefits just listed. Two important ones are the degree of
unofficial dollarization and the conditions implied by the theory of
optimum currency areas.
The higher the degree of unofficial dollarization, the lower the
seigniorage a country earns from its domestic currency and, there-
fore, the lower is its potential loss from official dollarization. This
consideration is particularly relevant in many developing countries
where unofficial dollarization is high or increasing (e.g., Latin
America). In such countries, the costs, measured as flow cost from
official dollarization in terms of lost seigniorage would be small, un-
less monetary expansion and inflation are high.
The theory of optimum currency areas points to high factor mo-
bility, symmetric shocks, and a relatively high degree of trade inte-
gration as factors that are conducive to official dollarization or other
forms of a common currency (Mundell 1961). The original theory is
silent on specifics that would make its application clearer, such as how
much factor mobility and trade integration is enough to make an
optimum currency area. Still, it strongly implies that an optimum
currency area exists where there is a large country that has a dominant
currency and where considerable trade and labor mobility exists be-
tween it and its smaller neighbors. These conditions broadly point to
the U.S. dollar as the dominant currency in the Caribbean and Cen-
tral America, and possibly throughout the Western Hemisphere.
They also point to the euro as the soon dominant currency in Europe.
(Euro notes will not circulate until 2002, so for the time being Ger-
man mark notes are the most widely used currency, especially in
Eastern Europe.)
Recent reassessments of the theory (see, particularly, Frankel and
Rose 1997), however, suggest that the existence of a common cur-
rency itself strengthens the optimal currency area conditions by mak-
ing the regions in a currency area more integrated over time. Optimal
currency area conditions may well be endogenous to the type of
monetary regime in a given area. This implies wider applicability of
common currency areas than implied by the original statement of the
theory. The successful movement of the 11 quite different European
economies toward a common currency also seems to corroborate this
idea, and may herald an era of wider monetary integrations around
the dollar, euro, and yen as key currencies.
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A country’s decision to officially dollarize depends on broad factors
as well as narrow calculations of the quantifiable costs and benefits of
seigniorage. The broad factors include how far a country wishes to
become integrated into a wider currency and trade area, whether it
seeks to impose discipline by eliminating discretionary monetary
policy, whether it is seeking to break from a history of high inflation,
the degree to which it views a domestic currency as an indispensable
element of national sovereignty, and the government’s perception of
domestic political constraints on making foreign currency the only
legal tender.
The mixture of factors will vary across countries. Generally, how-
ever, the tradeoff for smaller countries is between the elimination of
the currency risk (including currency crises) and financial and trade
benefits of integration into a dominant currency area on the one
hand, and the political and economic costs of giving up a domestic
currency on the other. Importantly, the decision to officially dollarize
or not is political as well as economic, and in many cases political
considerations outweigh purely economic ones. However, as global-
ization proceeds, the politics of monetary policy may shift from a
stress on national sovereignty to a stress on regional integration, as has
already happened in Western Europe. In countries that have forgone
independent monetary policy—currency board countries—taking the
final step by fully dollarizing may entail no additional loss of monetary
sovereignty, except for the symbolism of the national currency.
4
Outlook for Official Dollarization in the
Western Hemisphere
In important respects, the Western Hemisphere has long been a de
facto U.S. dollar area. In many countries, the dollar is the main or an
important unit of account, means of payment for large transactions,
and a store of value. Residents of most countries in the hemisphere
hold considerable amounts of dollar notes and bank deposits. Also, all
economies in the hemisphere are already strongly influenced by eco-
nomic conditions in the United States, through both current and
capital accounts, so their degree of policy independence is limited.
These initial conditions, combined with the historically contractionary
4For a description of how to dollarize a currency board system, see Schuler (1998), and
Hanke and Schuler (1999). For a description of how to dollarize a central banking system,
see Schuler (1999).
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1999a), suggest that the costs of official dollarization may be relatively
low, especially compared with countries that do not have a high de-
gree of unofficial dollarization.
Given the general costs and benefits of full dollarization described
above and recent economic developments, what are the prospects for
official dollarization in the region? Proposals for official dollarization
have been made in many countries from time to time, but have taken
on a new importance today. Recent proposals (such as Cordeiro 1999)
have been prompted by the experience of Argentina’s currency board
system and by financial crises in Mexico and Argentina in 1994–95
and in Brazil and Ecuador in 1999.
Ecuador
Following Brazil’s devaluation in January 1999, the Ecuadorian
sucre came under increased speculative pressure. It was devalued on
March 2. The same day, eight troubled banks closed. On March 11,
the government froze deposits in the entire banking system. Discon-
tent about the financial crisis and the state of the economy generally
have created interest in the possibility of dollarization (Cordeiro 1999,
Schuler 2000, IEEP 2000).
On January 9, 2000, President Mahuad announced official dollar-
ization to end the rapid depreciation of the sucre. Political unrest
caused the change in government on March 21 and the successor
President Noboa has pushed forward the dollarization project. In
February 2000, the government sent to parliament a comprehensive
set of laws inaugurating the new monetary system based on the U.S.
dollar and a number of structural reforms. The government has also
announced that it may take six months to implement official dollar-
ization, which would make Ecuador the world’s largest officially dol-
larized country. The proposal includes provisions for Ecuador to
maintain the parallel circulation of sucre coins and lower-denomination
banknotes issued by a currency board at par with the U.S. dollar. Thus
far, the currency reform could be termed a success. However, fiscal
adjustments and further banking reforms are necessary to reap the full
benefits of the new monetary system.
Argentina
The Convertibility Plan of 1991 established a currency board-like
system. Argentina was heavily dollarized unofficially when the plan
went into operation: U.S. dollar notes were estimated to exceed do-
mestic currency notes and bank deposits combined. Under the cur-
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share of foreign currency deposits to the broad money supply, has
been high—44 percent in 1995 (Balin ˜o et al. 1999: 2, Table 1). Also,
the share of foreign currency deposits has increased even since the
Convertibility Plan began, suggesting that the process may be irre-
versible. Far from hindering use of the dollar, Argentina has encour-
aged it by giving the dollar practically legal tender status in large
classes of transactions. The dollar is widely used as a unit of account
and means of payment in private financial transactions, although the
government uses the peso as its sole unit of account.
In January 1999, President Carlos Menem announced that the
government was studying the possibility of full official dollarization.
He was prompted to do so by lingering doubts about the credibility of
the currency board-like system. Despite the system’s good perfor-
mance, Argentina has experienced interest-rate spikes in 1992, during
Mexico’s currency crisis in 1994–95, and during the Asian and Brazil
currency crises since 1997. When the Mexican crisis spilled over and
created speculative pressure against the Argentine peso in 1995, the
Argentine government threatened to officially dollarize, which helped
reduce the pressure. Given that the Argentine peso is worth one
dollar, moving from the present currency board-like system to official
dollarization would not be technically difficult (Hanke and Schuler
1999), but it entails other considerations such as seigniorage sharing
that may require prolonged bilateral negotiations and treaties (Joint
Economic Committee 2000). The continued rise in unofficial dollar-
ization indicates that the lost seigniorage is smaller than it would be
in, say, South Korea, which is not heavily dollarized unofficially.
The flow seigniorage cost of dollarization is the lowest in Argentina
from among a group of countries in the region—0.5 percent of GDP
per year. And it could be reduced further if Argentina reaches an
agreement with the United States on seigniorage sharing. The re-
maining primary concerns on the cost side are the lender of last resort
function and the threat of an extreme depression that may require a
reintroduction of currency. As far as the lender of last resort is con-
cerned, contingent credit lines, bilateral or multilateral support, and
the strong presence of foreign banks would all tend to minimize the
threat of collapse of the system under extreme circumstances. Under
conditions as during the Great Depression, however, exit from the
system would be difficult.
On the benefit side of the equation, the principal gains, as outlined
above, would be permanent elimination of the currency risk (and the
risk of currency crises) and, therefore, a further decline in Argentina’s
interest premium over the United States, and tighter financial inte-
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interest rates is due to devaluation risk as opposed to real or fiscal
uncertainty, Borensztein and Berg (2000) estimate that full dollariza-
tion could bring about benefits in terms of lower spreads that would
amount to 1 percent of GDP. The associated benefits of tighter trade
and financial integration, and greater fiscal- and financial-sector dis-
cipline, perhaps due to improvements in supervision and regulation,
would be expected to become important in the long run.
Brazil
Brazil’s current economic program uses a floating exchange rate
and budget cuts to restore some of the credibility the real has lost
during the crises. Critical to the success of the program will be the
government’s ability to stick with fiscal adjustment, and the path of
real interest rates that results from the market’s perception of gov-
ernment policies. The government has shown no intention of fully
dollarizing the system.
El Salvador
The Salvadoran colo ´n was pegged at 2.50 per U.S. dollar for a
half-century before being devalued in the 1980s, in the midst of a
lengthy civil war. It was stabilized at 8.75 per dollar in 1992 and has
remained at that rate since. In 1994, even before Mexico’s currency
crisis, the Salvadoran central bank and government considered estab-
lishing a currency board to ensure that the colo ´n would not be de-
valued again. In 1995 the government took a step beyond and an-
nounced that it intended to officially dollarize El Salvador. Later it
dropped the plan in the face of opposition at home to eliminating a
symbol of national identity; and international financial institutions
were reported to have claimed that El Salvador’s economy and fiscal
situation were not healthy enough for dollarization (Chronicle of
Latin American Affairs 1995). In early 1999, President Armando Cal-
dero ´n Sol reiterated interest in official dollarization, after debate on
the subject in Argentina brought it into the news. Since President
Caldero ´n Sol left office in June, he has left it to his successor to
decide whether to pursue official dollarization. Most recently, on
November 22, 2000, President Francisco Flores announced the de-
cision to dollarize.
Mexico
Since its 1994 currency crisis, prominent Mexican and foreign fig-
ures have debated suggestions that Mexico establish a currency board
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recently, a number of Mexican businessmen and trade associations
have expressed support for full dollarization (Tricks 1999). Among the
foreign economists, Dornbusch (1997) has argued for official dollar-
ization rather than a currency board on the grounds that Mexico has
less credibility in monetary policy than does Argentina.
Peru
There is some interest in official dollarization in Peru, which ended
a hyperinflation in the early 1990s but has had recurring problems
with exchange rate depreciation. Peru has extensive unofficial dollar-
ization: 64 percent of the broad money supply is held in U.S. dollar
deposits (Balin ˜o et al. 1999: 2, Table 1).
Finally, in several Caribbean countries the U.S. dollar is already
widely used by central banks as a reserve currency and by the public
as a store of value. Also, Eastern Caribbean Monetary Union, Cayman
Islands, and Bermuda operate currency board-like systems. The small
size of Caribbean economies and their generally low levels of mon-
etary expansion and inflation suggest that the costs of official dollar-
ization would not be unduly high. However, more powerful than the
quantifiable costs for encouraging official dollarization will be the
likely tendency of greater economic integration in the Western Hemi-
sphere around the U.S. dollar as the key currency.
To summarize, in the Western Hemisphere, initial conditions with
high unofficial dollarization, periodic currency crises, and the gener-
ally good performance of the Argentine currency board-like system
and Panama’s experience with full dollarization have revived interest
in monetary unions, including its ultimate form: official or full dol-
larization. The issue has emerged as a topic of lively debate in Ar-
gentina and El Salvador and elsewhere. In the end, the outcome of
Ecuador’s dollarization and the ongoing discussion on officially dol-
larizing Argentina will likely serve as landmarks, leading either to a
further rise or a decline in the interest of other countries in the
region.
Conclusion
The advent of the euro and recent currency crises affecting ex-
change rates other than those that are floating or firmly fixed, often in
the form of currency boards, have brought official dollarization into
the spotlight. Previous analyses suggested that the costs of official
dollarization were high. But in recent decades, extensive unofficial
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GDP ratio and greater use of noncash forms of money, and lower
monetary growth and inflation in many countries have reduced the
potential costs of full dollarization. Using several countries in the
Western Hemisphere as examples, we have shown that these costs
may be relatively low (as in Argentina). Initial conditions including
the already high unofficial dollarization in many Latin American
countries and multiple benefits arising from the elimination of the
domestic currency risk, while difficult to quantify, suggest that the
balance on full dollarization may be more favorable than it was several
decades ago.
We have also discussed broader factors that are likely to influence
countries where official dollarization is now being debated. The
worldwide trend toward greater regional integration bodes well for
full dollarization, because it reduces the perceived loss of national
sovereignty from adopting a foreign currency. On the basis of that
trend, we would expect some rise in the number of economies offi-
cially using the U.S. dollar, the European euro, and perhaps the
Japanese yen.
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